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are a people without a historical umbilical cord: as an intelligent
student said to me last week, "Wasn't it remarkable how President
Roosevelt finally got us to take on Hitler." Just as every American
generation thinks sex was invented when it hit puberty, every political cohort strongly supports stare if it likes the decisis. American
law has been politically "seduced" since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.

THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE. Edited by
Randy E. Barnett.t Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University
Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 416. Cloth, $39.50.
Larry Alexander2
I

The ninth amendment is like a mysterious, unopened box only
(relatively) recently discovered among constitutional artifacts. It
has not yet been placed on public display because the constitutional
curators are unsure in which section of the museum to place it.
Some, the minimalists, believe that it is empty and should be regarded as a very minor exhibit in the federal powers wing. Then
there are the maximalists, those who think the ninth amendment
box is full and that it belongs in the individual rights wing of the
museum. Some maximalists (the optimists) think the box is a treasure trove of rights that we should open as soon as possible. Indeed,
they urge that the box and its contents not be kept in the museum at
all, but should be put into service to deal with contemporary
problems. Other maximalists (the pessimists) fear the ninth amendment is a Pandora's box that should in the public interest remain
closed, despite the constitutional framers' desire that it be opened.
They are quite content to treat the amendment as a museum piece
and nothing more.
Interest in the ninth amendment is perhaps at an all time high.
Evidence of this is the publication of a major symposium on the
amendment and the book that is the subject of this review. The
symposium,J also edited by Professor Barnett, consists of contemporary analyses of the ninth amendment. The book, on the other
hand, is a collection of the major writings on the ninth amendment
1.
2.
3.
(1988).

Professor of Law, Illinois Instiute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 35-268
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arranged chronologically from Madison's speech to the House of
Representatives in support of the Bill of Rights to Charles Black's
mid-1980 s essay. The book and the symposium are nice complements because the essays in the book are predominantly focused on
the historical, textual, and analytical evidence of the framers' intentions regarding the ninth amendment, while the contributions to the
symposium are much more concerned with the contemporary policy implications of various interpretations of the amendtnent.
II

All of the positions that I listed above on the ninth amendment's meaning are represented in the book and in the symposium,
though the pessimists are somewhat in disguise.4 Disregarding subtle differences among commentators within each camp, here are the
interpretations in play.
The minimalists view the ninth amendment as rhetorical only,
analytically unnecessary and important, if at all, only psychologically. According to their theory, this amendment was inserted in
the Bill of Rights to allay two concerns. One concern was that
adoption of the Bill of Rights would imply that the federal government possessed plenary regulatory power except as prohibited by
the first eight amendments. The other concern was that adoption of
the Bill of Rights would imply that the Constitution repealed ex in
propio vigore various rights granted by state law against the statesin other words, that the Bill of Rights would be read to be exhaustive of all rights, whether against the federal government or against
the states, state law grants of rights notwithstanding.
In Barnett's book, the two camps of minimalists are represented by Raoul Berger (ninth amendment intended to block any
inference of otherwise unlimited federal powers) and by Russell
Caplan (ninth amendment intended to block any inference of repeal
of state-granted rights). (In Barnett's symposium, Michael McConnell also joins the Caplan wing of the minimalists, s a wins that also
includes Robert Bork). 6
Each minimalist position faces a major objection. If the ninth
amendment was intended to block an inference of unlimited federal
powers from inclusion of the Bill of Rights, then, as most who argue
against minimalism point out, the tenth amendment was redun4. See infra Part IV.
5. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.[-]KENT
L. REv. 89 (1988).
6. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 184-85 (1989).
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dant. 7 On the other hand, the idea that the ninth amendment was
intended to negate repeal of rights under state law encounters the
objection that the inference of such repeal is itself too bizarre to
have been a motivating factor behind the ninth amendment's inclusion.8 Put differently, any sane interpretation of the Constitution
plus the Bill of Rights but minus the ninth amendment would leave
most state-law-based individual rights in place unless and until
Congress exercised its limited enumerated powers in ways inconsistent with such state laws.
Most of the remaining contributors to both Barnett's book and
his symposium are optimistic maximalists who view the ninth
amendment as constitutionalizing unenumerated moral rights.9 On
this view, the ninth amendment is neither redundant nor silly. Instead it reflects the framers' recognition of the higher moral law
that the Constitution was meant to instantiate.
The optimistic maximalists themselves divide into two camps
depending upon the types of arguments about unenumerated constitutional rights that they believe the ninth amendment makes admissible. The "constructivists" would recognize as ninth amendment
rights only those that are consistent with or presupposed by the
enumerated rights and powers.•o In other words, a ninth amendment constructivist would pedigree under that provision, not true
7. See. e.g., Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 37; Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth. and Plead
the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment'!, id. at 239, 245-46.
8. See, e.g., Sager, at 243-45.
9. Amon& these are Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment in
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEoPLE (R. Barnett ed. 1989); Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law, id. at 67; Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, id. at 93; Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth
Amendment, id. at 291; Mcintosh, On Reading the Ninth Amendment: A Reply To Raoul
Berger, id. at 219; Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, id. at 107; Redlich, Are These
"Certain Rights ... Retained By The People'?, id. at 127; and Van Loan, Natural Rights and
The Ninth Amendment, id. at 149.
There is an interpretation of the ninth amendment intermediate between minimalism
and maximalism. According to this interpretation, the amendment constitutionalized as
against the federal government a closed list of certain specific rights that were recognized by
the state governments in 1791. In Barnett's book, this interpretation is adopted by Massey as
part of the meaning of the ninth amendment. Elsewhere, Henry Monaghan has proposed this
interpretation as perhaps the entire meaning of the amendment. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 367 (1981). Note that this interpretation limits application
of the ninth amendment to acts of the federal government, whereas the maximalists would
apply it to the states as well, either through due process incorporation, or, more logically, in
its own right.
10. In Barnett's book, Black, Massey, Mcintosh, and Redlich all appear to be constructivist maximalists. Stephen Macedo-Recuons, Rheton"c, and the Ninth Amendment: A Comment on Sanford Levision, 64 CHt.(-]KENT L. REv. 163 (1988)-and Andrzej RapaczynskiThe Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution, id. at 177-also appear to be in this
camp.
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moral rights, but only those rights that, following Ronald Dworkin,u the interpreter derives from the best political/moral theory
that would justify the Constitution's text (enumerated rights, powers, and structure). The "naturalists," on the other band, would
read the ninth amendment as constitutionalizing any and all moral
rights we actually have, regardless of their relation to the Constitution's text.tz
The constructivists are in theory the more constrained of the
optimistic maximalists. Some, like John Ely, are in fact quite constrained: Ely reads the dominant intention behind the Constitution
as a whole to be the proceduralist one of establishing a representative democracy rather than a substantive one presupposing a vision
of the just society. Ely, therefore, would construct out of the openended provisions like the ninth amendment only such rights as are
necessary to reinforce representative decisionmaking.t3 Other constructivists, such as Ronald Dworkin,t4 Richard Epstein,ts and
David Richards,t6 find a complete substantive vision presupposed
by the text and would locate the nontextual portion of that vision in
the open-ended provisions.
The naturalists, on the other hand, would not restrict ninth
amendment rights to those that link up with and round out the intentions behind the more specific constitutional rights and powers.
They would admit any argument that seeks to establish that such
and such a moral right is one that we actually have, regardless of its
textual pedigree. The only link the naturalists maintain to the historical Constitution is that the ninth amendment is part of that document, and the intention behind it is to constitutionalize our moral
rights.

III
One complication in this taxonomy concerns the possible conflict between the rights we actually have-those the naturalist
would read into the ninth amendment-and the more specific provisions of the Constitution. The constructivists would appear to have
11. SeeR. DWOllKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE Cbs. 6-7 (1986).
12. The naturalists in Barnett's book are Barnett himself, Corwin, Patterson, and Van
Loan. Examples of the naturalist position in the symposium are Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, supra note 3, at 67; Grey, The Uses of an
Unwritten Constitution. id. at 211; and Sager, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution, id. at 239.
13. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
14. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11.
15. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN (1985).
16. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1986).
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no difficulty here since their ninth amendment is supposedly constructed out of the rest of the Constitution. The naturalists, however, need some account of how to resolve conflicts between the
unwritten higher law and the written text that refers to it.''
This point leads to a more general point about the maximalists'
ninth amendment, which is that it provides a very good lens
through which to view the central jurisprudential problem, the relation of "reason" and "will" in law generally and in constitutional
law in particular.ts Put briefly, when we promulgate constitutions
and laws, we seek to instantiate the moral rights we really have and
the design of governmental structures and powers that is most conducive to bringing out (really) just, good, and wise government. In
short, we attempt to follow reason. On the other hand, because we
are fallible, any decision we actually reach on these matters-the
constitutions and laws we actually will-may, from another's (or
our later selves') perspective, conflict with reason. From that perspective, our reason and our will are opposed. Yet, to complete this
picture, our reason also tells us that, fallible though we are, we must
decide things with some finality, that is, "will" some results that
will be effectively final over a range of cases, even though what we
will may not be what reason would later tell us we should have
willed.
It is this complex relationship between reason and will that lies
at the heart of the general jurisprudential disputes between positivism and natural law, between narrow interpretivism and broad interpretivism/noninterpretivism, and between process orientations
and outcomes orientations. In fact, all these disputes are just different angles on the one big battle between will and reason. Will and
reason are complements-will detached from reason is tyrannical,
and reason without will is anarchical-but they are also, given
human fallibility, always potentially opposed to one another.
The maximalists' ninth amendment offers the illusion of a way
to overcome the opposition of will and reason. For according to the
maximalists, the ninth amendment represents a willing that judges
be guided by nothing but their reason in ascertaining our rights, an
interpretivist basis for engaging in noninterpretive judicial review.
17. Their best bet would be to interpret the "incorrect" parts of the written text as a set
of narrow rules that are to be followed within their limited domain rather than as broad but
incorrect principles. See Alexander, The Constitution as Law, 6 CoNST. CoMM. 103, 113
(1989); Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's
Theory of Law, 6 LAW AND PHIL. 419, 432-34 (1987); Alexander, Modern Equal Protection
Theones.· A Metatheoretica/ Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 14-16 (1981).
18. See Alexander, Essay: Of Two Minds About Law and Minds (forthcoming MICH. L.
REv., 1990); Alexander, The Constitution as Law, supra note 17.
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Indeed, argue the maximalists, if we really want to be interpretivists, then paradoxically we should be noninterpretivists, at least
about rights, since interpreting what the framers willed in the ninth
amendment yields that result.I9 Surely the ninth amendment represents the best of all jurisprudential worlds, reason and will, substance and procedure, noninterpretivism and interpretivism, all
brought together in harmony.
Of course, this really is just an illusion. The central problems
of jurisprudence cannot be legislated away by the ninth amendment
or by anything else. It is easy enough to see that the naturalists
can't avoid these problems. For what if we accept their invitation
to constitutionalize through the ninth amendment the moral rights
we actually have. Not only will we have to decide what to do in
case our actual moral rights under the ninth amendment tum out to
conflict with other parts of the constitutional text, but we will also
have to face the possibility that the moral rights we actually have
include the right not to have decisions about our rights made by an
unelected judiciary untethered to a written text. Just as the maximalists argue that the ninth amendment is a narrow interpretivist
warrant for engaging in broad interpretivism or noninterpretivism,
engaging in the latter may lead us back to narrow interpretivism.
To avoid infinite looping, we will have to reject the authority of the
ninth amendment, in essence excise it from the Constitution. Radical surgery to be sure, but inevitable if the rights we actually have
include the right not to be governed by judges.
The constructivist maximalists appear to avoid the problem of
having moral rights conflict with their noninterpretive imposition
by judges because they view ninth amendment rights as constructed
from the other rights, powers, and structures found in the text. But
except for Ely's version of constructivism, which sees almost all of
the Constitution as reflecting a specific procedural concern, most
constructivist theories tum out to be indistinguishable from naturalist ones. Constructivism that would extend textual mistakes by
building an entire, judicially-enforceable political/moral theory out
of the text is bizarre. After all, the political/moral theory so constructed is by hypothesis an incorrect one. Moreover, the reasons to
advert to a text-to provide certainty, separate powers, and monitor
decisionmakers--don't apply to the way that broad constructivists
treat the text and the intentions behind it. Constructivism of this
type no more serves these rule of law values than does unbridled
naturalism. Therefore, constructivism that builds on the text, mistakes and all, has neither the rule of law virtues associated with will
19.

See Sager, supra note 7, at 254-61.
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nor the virtue of correctness associated with reason.zo
This is why broad constructivists usually tum out to be naturalists in thin disguise. They either interpret the text at such a high
level of generality that will and reason merge ("the framers willed
whatever reason dictates"), or they find presupposed in the framers'
narrower intentions a political/moral theory that just so happens to
be the one the constructivists would recommend on grounds of reason alone. Surely one can justifiably suspect that the Lockean or
Rawlsian visions of the constitutional order favored by constructivists Epstein, Dworkin, and Richards are favored because they are
viewed as correct and not because they are the best ways to construe
the historical framers' enterprise. The constitutional text and intentions behind it seem to be makeweights in the constructivists'
recommendations.
If this is correct, then there really isn't a dime's worth of difference between naturalism and broad constructivism as maximalist
approaches to the ninth amendment. The basic problem of naturalism-that one plausible right we have is the right not to be ruled by
unelected judges unbound by a text-is applicable as well to constructivism. I might also add that Barnett's own version of the naturalist approach, which he sets forth in the Introduction to the
book, is aftlicted by the same problems that aftlict naturalism generally. His approach would have courts indulge a presumption in
favor of common law liberties, a presumption that could be overcome by demonstrating a compelling governmental interest. In my
experience, tests framed in terms of presumptions, levels of scrutiny, degrees of compellingness of governmental interests, etc., are
empty and therefore totally manipulable in the absence of a background politicaVmoral theory. And when one has in hand such a
theory through which these tests might be fleshed out, the theory
ends up doing all the real work, as it should.
IV

I have not yet mentioned any ninth amendment maximalists
who are also pessimists, who view the ninth amendment as an invitation from the framers to constitutionalize unwritten rights that we
must decline because of our own moral convictions. One reason I
have not mentioned any pessimists is that I haven't found any clear
examplars of the breed in Barnett's book, his symposium, or else20. See Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law, supra note 17, at 430-31.
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where for that matter.21 On the other hand, I think that Ely's narrow, process-focused constructivism is motivated in large part, not
by Ely's reading of the ninth amendment framers' intentions, but by
his abhorrence of a judiciary given free reign to block the popular
will by appeal to unwritten rights.22 Similarly, Michael McConnell's contribution to Barnett's symposium, while it adopts a minimalist interpretation of the amendment, seems all too clearly to be
driven by the same concem.23 For them, better to take our chances
with majoritarian mistakes about our moral rights than with judicial ones. More strongly, for them perhaps one of our moral rights
is a right against judicial imposition of specific rights that lack a
textual basis. If the ninth amendment was intended to legitimize
such judicial imposition, then, on the basis of proper preconstitutional norms,24 those that tell us why and to what extent the Constitution is authoritative and what interpretive methodology we
should apply to it, we should reject the constitutional authority of
the ninth amendment.
If we were to adopt the pessimists' approach and ignore the
ninth amendment, it would not be the first constitutional provision
to meet such a fate. For example, the Supreme Court has made the
fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause into a
dead letter,2s though its probable intended function has been taken
over by the due process clause. But no other constitutional provision has been ignored on the explicit ground that it leads to immoral results. (There are, however, some decisions-B/aisde/1,26 for
example-that might be characterized as implicit rejections of the
Constitution on moral grounds.)

v
The ninth amendment is surely worth thinking about seriously,
and Barnett's book and his symposium are the best and really the
only places to begin. But if minimalism is an untenable interpretation of the amendment, we are left with maximalism and are therefore in the middle of all the big questions of constiutional
jurisprudence. And nothing we can learn about the ninth amendment will help us there.
21. John Ely accuses Justice Black of being a pessimist. ELY, The Ninth Amendment in
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 179, 185-86 (R. Barnett ed. 1989), at 185-86.
22. See generally J. ELY, supra note 13, ch. 3.
23. McConnell, supra note 5, at 100-09.
24. See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
25. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
26. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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